Concurrent signature, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson, is known to just fall short to solve the long standing fair exchange of signature problem without requiring any trusted third party (TTP). The price for not requiring any TTP is that the initial signer is always having some advantage over the matching signer in controlling whether the protocol completes or not, and hence, whether the two ambiguous signatures will bind concurrently to their true signers or not. In this paper, we examine the notion and classify the advantages of the initial signer into three levels, some of which but not all of them may be known in the literature. -Advantage level 0 is the commonly acknowledged fact that concurrent signature is not abuse-free since an initial signer who holds a keystone can always choose to complete or abort a concurrent signature protocol run by deciding whether to release the keystone or not. -Advantage level 1 refers to the fact that the initial signer can convince a third party that both ambiguous signatures are valid without actually making the signatures publicly verifiable. -Advantage level 2 allows the initial signer to convince a third party that the matching signer agrees to commit to a specific message, and nothing else.We stress that advantage level 2 is not about proving the possession of a keystone. Proving the knowledge of a keystone would make the malicious initial signer accountable as this could only be done by the initial signer. We remark that the original security models for concurrent signature do not rule out the aforementioned advantages of the initial signer. Indeed, we show that theoretically, the initial signer always enjoys the above advantages for any concurrent signatures. Our work demonstrates a clear gap between the notion of concurrent signature and optimistic fair exchange (OFE) Abstract. Concurrent signature, introduced by Chen, Kudla and Paterson, is known to just fall short to solve the long standing fair exchange of signature problem without requiring any trusted third party (TTP). The price for not requiring any TTP is that the initial signer is always having some advantage over the matching signer in controlling whether the protocol completes or not, and hence, whether the two ambiguous signatures will bind concurrently to their true signers or not. In this paper, we examine the notion and classify the advantages of the initial signer into three levels, some of which but not all of them may be known in the literature.
Introduction
Fair exchange of digital signatures has been considered as a fundamental problem in cryptography. It is a useful cryptographic protocol that allows secure and fair e-commerce applications to exchange digital signatures for legal contracts or agreements. Nowadays, goods and services are being exchanged electronically over the Internet. Our main goal is to ensure that the exchanges are fair, which means that at the end of an exchange between two parties, either both parties receive the complete items or none of them obtains anything.
Fairness in exchanging signatures is normally achieved with the help of a trusted third party (TTP), which is often offline. There were several attempts where a fair exchange of signatures can be achieved with a "semi-trusted" TTP who can be called upon to handle disputes between signers [2] . This type of fair exchanges is also referred to as an optimistic fair exchange (OFE) [3, 4] . A well-known open problem in fair exchange is the requirement of a dispute resolving TTP whose role cannot be replaced by a normal certification authority.
In Eurocrypt 2004 [6] , Chen, Kudla and Paterson presented a new cryptographic primitive called "concurrent signature" to allow two parties to produce two ambiguous signatures, such that both signatures do not bind to their true signers. Upon the release of the signatures, any third party cannot identify the true signer who generated the signature. However, upon the release of an extra piece of information called the keystone, both signatures will bind concurrently. The merit of concurrent signature relies on the fact that there is no TTP required. This has been considered to be very practical, and hence, concurrent signatures have been promising to be adopted in practice (c.f. OFE where the need for a TTP may not exist in the real scenario). The demand of requiring a TTP in cryptographic schemes has made cryptographic schemes less attractive for adoption in practice, and hence, concurrent signatures have been very promising in bridging the gap between theoreticians and practitioners. Further, Chen, Kudla and Paterson presented a concrete concurrent signature scheme based on a variant of Schnorr based ring signature scheme [1] . In their scheme, any third party cannot be convinced that a signature has indeed been signed by one particular signer, since any signer can always generate this signature by himself/herself.
In a concurrent signature protocol run, there are two parties involved, namely Alice and Bob (or A and B, respectively). Since one party is required to create a keystone and sends the first message to the other party, we call this party as the initial signer. A party who responds to the initial signature by creating another signature is called a matching signer. Without losing generality, throughout this paper, we assume that Alice (or A, resp.) is the initial signer and Bob (or B, resp.) is the matching signer.
It is acknowledged that concurrent signature is not perfectly fair, since Alice is in control of the time at which the keystone is released and thus, control when the ambiguous signatures become binding to their respective signers. Alice can even decide not to complete a concurrent signature protocol run if Alice decided not to to release the keystone ultimately. Nonetheless, the concept of fairness in a concurrent signature is defined as follows: "once Alice releases the keystone, both ambiguous signatures from Alice and Bob binds concurrently". Specifically, it is required that Alice cannot output a maliciously crafted keystone so that the ambiguous signature from Bob together with this keystone passes the verification algorithm, yet verification of the ambiguous signature created by Alice (perhaps also maliciously) together with this keystone would output failure. We call this definition of fairness a "white-box" guarantee, as the malicious Alice is required to convert the ambiguous signature corresponding to Bob to a "well-formed" publicly verifiable signature under Bob to be considered successful. This is possibly sufficient for legal contract signing purpose, since the contract is only valid if and only if a "well-formed" signature is present. This definition is adopted in Chen et al.'s paper and the subsequent works.
Fairness in Practice
In this paper, we make the observation that the formal definition of fairness does not necessarily capture the fairness in practice completely. For example, there is no guarantee that Alice could not convince a third party Carol that Bob has signed a message, M B , that is, committed to M B , without revealing the keystone. We identify that a malicious initial signer may enjoy three levels of advantages in concurrent signature. These advantage levels have concrete implications regarding the use of concurrent signatures in practical scenarios. As discussed by Chen et al. in their seminal paper [6] , it is very often the case that the matching signer would not mind sacrificing level 0 advantage. However, regarding level 1 and 2 advantages, concurrent signatures may not be suitable in some other scenarios such as tendering systems (c.f. [6] as we will show with details in the later part of this paper). On the other hand, contrary to the common belief that concurrent signature is applicable to tendering systems (such as [6, 17, 18] ), level 1 advantage to a malicious initial signer could be unacceptable to some of the suppliers. Hence, in those scenarios, the OFE [2] [3] [4] 7] or Ambiguous OFE [10] [11] [12] systems are indeed more suitable compared to concurrent signatures.
Our Contributions
Firstly, we show that any constructions of concurrent signature following Chen, Kudla and Peterson is always subject to abuse by the initial signer, with advantage level 1 and 2, in addition to the commonly acknowledged advantage level 0. We present generic methods that allow a malicious initial signer to convince any third party that he/she has the ability to make both signatures verifiable (level 1), or that the matching signer has committed to his message (level 2). Secondly, we examine one variant of concurrent signatures, namely, asymmetric concurrent signature [13] and demonstrate how a malicious initial signer can exhibit his/her level 1 advantage in an effective manner. Our attack is practical and its implication may discourage the adoption of concurrent signatures in some application scenarios, and particularly, when it is undesirable to allow a malicious initial signer to convince anyone of the binding of the matching signer's signature without making the signature publicly verifiable.
Related Work
Following the seminal work by Chen et al., many subsequent concurrent signature schemes have been proposed (such as [13, 14, 16, 17] ). Nguyen [13] proposed an interesting variant that embraces the asymmetric property of concurrent signatures (c.f. the symmetric property of all the previously known concurrent signature schemes). Furthermore, Nguyen noted that the construction techniques of an asymmetric concurrent signature scheme can be used for constructing a multiparty concurrent signature scheme, which is the solution to the open problem stated in Chen et al.'s seminal work [6] . Subsequently, Tonien, Susilo and Safavi-Naini [16] proposed a multi-party concurrent signature scheme that uses a different model from the construction achieved from [13] .
In an orthogonal direction, Susilo, Mu and Zhang [14] investigated the privacy issue in concurrent signatures. They observed that prior the release of a keystone, and just from the two ambiguous signatures, any third party can already conclude that the two ambiguous signatures must be created by these two possible signers. At the same time, if the possible signers are believed to be honest, the outsider can already tell who the actual signer is corresponding to each ambiguous signature. They then introduced a stronger requirement called perfect ambiguity, which requires the ambiguous signatures to remain "ambiguous" even if the two potential signers are known to be honest. Unfortunately, their scheme is shown to be insecure by Wang, Bao and Zhou [17] , and subsequently, Wang et al. proposed a modified scheme that is proven secure under this stronger notion.
Yuen, Wong, Susilo and Huang [18] constructed a concurrent signature variant that supports negotiation between the initial signer and the matching signer on who will control the final binding of the ambiguous signatures. They showed that their model is compatible with the original definition by Chen et al. [6] .
Very recently, Tan, Huang and Wong [15] presented the first concurrent signature scheme that is based on the standard assumption. Their ambiguity model is very similar to the one proposed by Yuen et al. [18] .
Roadmap
In the next section, we review the notion of concurrent signatures due to Chen et al. and the notations used in the rest of this paper. In Section 3, we present our classification of advantage levels to the initial signer in detail, discuss their implications and present generic techniques which allows the initial signer to enjoy these advantages. In Section 4, we show how an initial signer can enjoy level 1 advantage in the asymmetric concurrent signature scheme due to Nguyen [13] . Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Notions and Definitions of Concurrent Signature

Notations
For a finite set S, we will denote by x ∈ R S the operation of selecting an element x uniformly at random from S. If p is a positive integer, we use Z Z p to denote the set {0, . . . , p − 1}.
Concurrent Signatures
In the following, we review the definition of concurrent signatures from [6] . A concurrent signature comprises four algorithms (SETUP, ASIGN, AVERIFY, VERIFY). Their formal definitions are given below.
SETUP. On input security parameter 1
λ , this probabilistic algorithm outputs the description of the set of participants U , the message space M, the signature space S, the keystone space K, the keystone fix space F, and a function KGEN : K → F. It is also assumed the public keys {X i } and their respective secret keys {x i } are also generated by this algorithm. We use π to denote additional system parameters. We assume (π, U , M, S, K, F, KGEN, {X i }) are available to all participants while each user retain his/her own secret key x i . ASIGN. On input (X i , X j , x i , h 2 , M) where X i , X j ∈ {X i } such that X i = X j , x i being the secret key corresponds to the public key X i , h 2 ∈ F, M ∈ M, this algorithm outputs an ambiguous signature σ = (s,
Below is a recap of the interactive protocol in which the above algorithms are used in the exchange of signatures in a concurrent manner amongst two participants.
1. We assume SETUP has been executed and all participants have their own key pair already.
Below we describe how Alice with key pair (X A , x A ) exchanges signatures with Bob with key pair (X B , x B ). The correctness is defined in the usual manner.
Alice picks a random k ∈ K, computes f = KGEN(k) and obtains σ
A := (s A , h A , f) from ASIGN(X A , X B , x A , f, M A ).Specifically, if σ = ASIGN(X i , X j , x i , f , M ) and S = (k, σ, X i , X j , M ), then AVERIFY(σ, X i , X j , M ) = 1. In addition, if f = KGEN(k) for some k ∈ K, then VERIFY(S) = 1.
Security Model
As discussed in [6] , a concurrent signature should satisfy three security requirements, namely, unforgeability, ambiguity and fairness. For completeness, we review these security requirements as follows.
Unforgeability
The following game is used to capture the existential unforgeability of a concurrent signature. 
Definition 1 (Unforgeability). A concurrent signature is unforgeable if no PPT adversary
such that f = KGEN(k). Otherwise C returns ⊥. 3. ASIGN: On input (X i , X j , h 2 , M) such that X i , X j ∈ {X i }, h 2 ∈ F, M ∈ M, C replies with ASIGN(X i , X j , x i , h 2 , M).
Secret Key Reveal: On input
X i ∈ {X i },
Ambiguity
The following game is used to capture ambiguity of a concurrent signature. 
Definition 2 (Ambiguity). A concurrent signature is ambiguous if no PPT adversary
= KGEN(k). C then flips a fair coin b ∈ R {0, 1}. If b = 0, C computes σ 0 = ASIGN(X i , X j , x i , f, M). Otherwise, C computes (s, h, f ) = ASIGN(X j , X i , x j , f, M) and parse σ 1 as (s, f, h). C returns σ b to A.
Fairness
The following game is used to capture fairness of a concurrent signature. Finally A either outputs a value k. A wins the game if f = KGEN(k) such that f was a previous output from KGEN query and no Keystone Reveal query on f was made.
Definition 3 (Fairness). A concurrent signature is fair if no PPT adversary
i = (s i , h 1 , h 2 ) such that AVERIFY((s i , h 1 , h 2 ), X i , X j , M i ) = 1. C returns σ j = (s j , h 3 , h 2 ) = ASIGN(X j , X i , x j , h 2 , M j ). Output.
Abusing Fairness in Concurrent Signatures
In this section, we discuss the various advantage levels enjoyed by the initial signer, their implications and how they could be acquired. At the high level, it is often the case that exhibiting such advantage requires the use of zero-knowledge proof [9] , which is reviewed as follows.
Zero-Knowledge Proof
A zero-knowledge proof [9] is an interactive protocol for one party, the prover, to prove to another party, the verifier, that some statement is true, without revealing anything other than the veracity of the statement. In [8] , it has been shown that, assuming the existence of one-way function, one can create a zero-knowledge proof system for the NP-complete graph coloring problem with three colors. Since every problem in NP can be efficiently reduced to this problem, it means that all problems in NP have zero-knowledge proofs. Later in [5] , it has been shown that anything that can be proved by an interactive proof system can be proved with zero knowledge.
Advantage Level 0
Level 0 advantage is inherent in concurrent signatures, as the initial signer, Alice, is in possession of the keystone, which is under the full control of Alice on when and whether the keystone will be released to the public. Thus, the primitive is not suitable if the matching signer will be at a disadvantage if withholding the keystone or delaying the release of the keystone would cause harm to the matching signer.
The Implications. Consider the tendering systems as discussed in the seminal paper of Chen et al. [6] . They described a scenario where A has a bridge-building contract that she would like to put out to tender. Suppose there are two companies B and C that wish to put in proposals to win this contract. In this scenario, B acts as the initial signer, as this is to prohibit A to show this contract to C to get a better proposal from C. We note that in this particular scenario, B has the full control of the keystone, since the keystone is selected by B. Therefore, if at the end of the tender, if A would like to select B as the winner of the tender, B may still have the liberty for not completing the contract by not releasing the keystone, and hence, it is unfair to A.
Advantage Level 1
The Abuse. Assume Alice is a malicious initial signer, whose purpose is to convince a third party Carol that the matching signer Carol is convinced that Alice and Bob are exchanging signatures on messages M A and M B and that Alice has the ability to complete the transaction.
The Implications.
Consider an open auction [17, 18] in which Alice's ambiguous signature is a contract to sell a certain goods while Bob's ambiguous signature is a contract of a bid. Level-1 advantage allows Alice to convince Carol that she has the ability to seal the contract with Bob and the bid is specified in M B . This allows Alice to safely urge Carol for a higher bid, and Bob is at a disadvantage.
We note that this implication is also applicable to the tendering systems as discussed previously. However, in this scenario, let us consider the case where A, who would like to put the bridgebuilding tender, is the initial signer. Hence, the company B and C will act as the matching signers. In this setting, A will take the advantage level 1 to convince C about B's tender, so that C will increase the value of her tender, and hence, disadvantaging B.
Advantage Level 2
The Abuse. Assume Alice is a malicious initial signer, whose purpose is to convince a third party Carol that the matching signer Bob has committed to message M B . Assume Alice and Bob have completed step 3 of the concurrent signature protocol (as described in Section 2.2). That is, Alice is in possession of a keystone k and the ambiguous signature from Bob σ B := (s B , h B , f) on message M B . At the same time, Bob is in possession of Alice's ambiguous signature σ A := (s A , h A , f) on message M A . Our observation on the incompleteness of the original fairness definition in [6] arises from the fact that to convince Carol about Bob's commitment to M B does not necessarily involve outputting some maliciously crafted keystonek. Specifically, in our generic attack, Alice conducts a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the tuple (k, σ B ) with Carol such that the following statements are true:
This would be sufficient to convince a third party about Bob's intention to sign a message M B , without revealing anything about Alice's intention, thus undermining the fairness guarantees of the concurrent signature schemes, and put Bob into disadvantage.
The Implications. Note that in the zero-knowledge proof, Alice does not reveal the keystone k, the keystone fix f , nor Bob's ambiguous signature. Thus, even if Carol is presented with the secret key of Bob, the ambiguous signatures σ A and σ B from Bob, she could not conclude that Alice has committed to M A . In other words, the only thing that Carol can be assured of is that Alice is in possession of a signature from Bob on message M B . Bob is left at an unfair position.
We would like to remark that both level 1 and 2 advantages are outside the security definition presented in Section 2.3. We also do not claim that existing concurrent signature schemes are broken for two reasons. Firstly, they are not within the security model. Secondly, even though they are theoretically possible, it is not always feasible. Thus, people should bear in mind any concurrent signature following this syntax could be abused by the initial signer, and hence, the adoption of concurrent signatures in application scenario should be examined to make sure that either the level 1 and 2 advantages of the initial signer are acceptable or that the advantages cannot be claimed efficiently.
Abusing Fairness in Asymmetric Concurrent Signatures
In this section, we demonstrate a practical abuse in advantage level 1 of the asymmetric concurrent signature due to Nguyen [13] . In this abuse, the initial signer can convince any verifier that he/she has the ability to make both ambiguous signatures verifiable. We would like to stress again that the attack is outside their original model and we therefore do not claim that we break Nguyen's original scheme.
Review of Nguyen's asymmetric concurrent signatures
For completeness, we will first review Nguyen's scheme.
